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GUARANTEE SCHEMES: AN ALTERNATIVE 
TO THE SUPERVISED CREDIT PROGRAM* 
by 
Marife T. Magno and Richard L. Meyer** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In response to a perennial problem of inadequate volume of 
credit going to the bo-called "kocially-debirable projects", in 
particular to agriculture and indigenoute indufetrieb, the 
government inktituted Several bupervibed credit programb (SCPb). 
More popular among theSe programs were Mabagana 99 (rice) and 
Maibagana (corn) which were launched in 1972. 
*Paper presented during the ACPC-PIDS-OSU sponsored Seminar-
workbhop on "Financial Intermediation in the Rural Sector: 
Research Rebultb and Policy Ibbueb" held on 26-27 September 1988 
at the Cuaderno Hall, Central Bank of the Philippines. This ib 
part of a larger Study on comparative bank analysis jointly con-
ducted by the Agricultural Credit Policy Council (ACPC), Philip-
pine Institute for Development Studied (PIDS) and Ohio State 
University (OSU). The project wab coordinated by Dr. Mario B . 
Lamberte (PIDS) and Dr. V . Bruce J. Tolentino (ACPC). 
**Rebpectively, Research Associate, PIDS and Profebbor, OSU. 
The viewb exprebbed in thiS Study are thoSe of the authorb 
and do not necebbarily reflect thobe of the Institute. 
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To Support the SCPS, liberal Selective credit policies, Such 
a's low interest rateS and cheap rediSqounting facilities have 
been adopted. AS noted in varioub Studied (TBAC 1985, Lamberte 
Snd Lim 1987), the SCPS were on the whole a failure. TheSe 
credit Subsidies did not reach the targeted clientele but rather 
led to miSallocation of resources, diSintermediation, inflation, 
high loan arrearages and loan failures which made banks more 
averse in extending credit to agriculture and indigenous 
industries. Hence, the Sector remained aS indebted and 
unbankable aS before. 
The government embarked on a SerieS of financial reforms 
Starting in 1980. Knowing that the major drawback of the 
prev-iouS credit programs StemS from the subsidized interest rates 
and cheap rediScounting policy, the financial reforms included 
deregulation of bank interest rateS and the alignment of 
rediscount rateS to the market rate. By 1985, the interest rateS 
and rediscount rates were wholly market oriented. In effect, 
interest rate SubSidieS to the priority SectorS were eliminated. 
The relaxation of interest rateS, however, did not produce 
the deSired reSultS but haS contributed to the reduced flow of 
loans to the Socially deSirable projects (TBAC 1985). It SeemS 
that the riSk and default conditions Surrounding agriculture and 
indigenous industries have not Significantly improved, and 
therefore, -any increase in deposits resulting from interest rate 
liberalization would not neceSSarily flow into theSe SectorS. 
BankS are Still reluctant to increase their expoSureS to 
agriculture aS well aS the indigenous industries. 
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To date, the SCPb are Slowly being phased out. Thib doeb 
not mean, however, that direct government intervention in the 
credit market haS been eliminated. Government intervention iS 
Still considered to be neceSSary to complement the liberalization 
policies. In place of the SCPS, ribk-reducing programs are being 
emphasized. By riSk-reducing programs, we refer to the credit 
guarantee programs. TheSe programs are the latest form of 
intervention in the financial market aimed at relieving the riSk-
burdenS faced by financial institution's in lending to the 
priority Sector. In the previous SCPS, funds for on-lending 
mainly came from the government with financial institutions 
Serving ab conduits. Under the ribk-reducing program, however, 
funds for on-lending come from the financial institutions. The 
government supports them by assuming certain portion of the riSk 
of default. 
ThiS paper examines the effectiveness of the credit 
guarantee .programs in increasing the amount of credit that goeS 
to agriculture and indigenous industries. Specifically, the 
following iSSueS will be addressed: (1) Do guarantee programs 
lead to additionally. in agricultural lending; (2) Do 
guarantee programs contribute to Small loanS; (3) Do guarantee 
programs encourage bankb to uSe their own fundb; (4) Do guaran-
tee programs reduce the coSt of lending to bankS; and (5) How 
cobt effective are the guarantee programs. 
The Study focuSeS on the four existing guarantee programs of 
the government, namely: (1) the Guarantee Fund for Small and 
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Medium Enterprises (GFSME); (2) the Industrial Guarantee and 
Loan Fund (IGLF); (3) the Quedan Guarantee Program (QGP) and 
(4) the Crop Insurance Program (CIP). 
The paper will be organized ab follows: Section II 
preSentS the conceptual framework. Here the hypothesis of 
the Study ab well aS the indicators to teSt this hypothesis are 
presented. 
Section III debcribeS the Special features of each guarantee 
program. The termS and conditions of loanS under the guarantee 
programs will albo be emphasized. 
Sections IV and V dibcubb the overall performance of the 
guarantee programs. Section IV preSentb information on how 
the guarantee funds have been utilized in termS of the type of 
banking institutions, the nature of investment and loan Size. 
The operational performance of the guarantee institutions/ 
agencieb iS albo presented. Section V diScubbeb the overall 
impact of the guarantee programs on the baSib of the hypotheSiS 
and the indicators prebented in Section II. 
Section's VI and VII dibcuSS the performance of the guarantee 
programs in termS of bank's' rebponSe to and abbesbment of 
the programs. Section VI uSeS primary data from the Comparative 
Bank Study Survey (1987). Section VII focuSeS on the 
caSe of the GFSME program. 
The labt two Section's present the conclusion's of the Study 
and Some policy recommendation's. 
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II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Lending institution's ubually charge a higher premium for 
ri^k for borrowers in the priority Sector's of the government than 
they do for the borrowers in the non-priority SectorS. (John'son, 
1974, Khatkhate and Villanueva 1978, Lipton 1979, PiSchke 1986). 
This is because the lenders associate an extra-normal ri'sk to the 
priority 'sector. A program Such aS the credit guarantee Scheme, 
which aims to reduce the perceived riSk-prevailing in agriculture 
and indigenous industries iS, therefore perceived a's being an 
effective way to reduce lender riSk and increase lending. 
The impact of a guarantee program on the Supply of credit to 
the priority Sector can be analyzed uSing a Supply-demand model 
developed by Gonzalez-Vega (1976) . The a's'sumptionb of the model 
are: FirSt, the banks operate under a competitive market. Second, 
there are only two typeS of borrower. One type iS a riSky 
borrower, in the 'senSe that the bank iS not familiar with the 
borrower or the project the borrower propoSe's to undertake with a 
loan. Project's in agriculture and indigenous industries 
frequently belong to thi's category. The other type i's a leSS 
ri'sky borrower:, with whom the bank ib acquainted with and/or who'se 
project's are well known. Third, the borrowers have an identical 
demand for credit. Thi's mean's that the marginal revenue curve's 
of both borrower's are 'similar. The latter assumption is 
important to isolate the effects on interest rate's of differences 
in their initial endowment's from that of differences in the co'st 
of lending. Relaxation of thi's a's'sumption, however, will not 
significantly alter the findings 'since we are dealing here with 
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elasticities. And fourth, coSt of fundb and lending cobtb are 
identical for both borrowers and differences aribe only in the 
cobt associated with default. 
The coSt of lending ib expected to be relatively higher for 
loanS to the riSky borrowers than to the lebb riSky borrowers. 
The difference in coSt i S d u e to the higher riSk premium 
associated with the ribky borrower. In effect, the marginal coSt 
(MC) curves of loanS to the two borrowers differs, where 
marginal coSt curve iS Steeper for the ribky borrower than the 
leSS ribky one. Thib meanS that the additional coSt per peSo of 
loan granted iS higher for the riSky borrower. 
The difference in the marginal coSt of the two borrowers 
would imply different lending interest rateb for both. Thib ib 
because bankS are profit-maximizerb and therefore would charge an 
interest rate at the point where MR = MC. In Figure II-l, this 
iS represented by the intersection between the MC curveb and the 
demand curveb. The demand curve for the whole banking industry 
i's actually equal to the value of the marginal productivity (VMP) 
of loanb. Hence, the optimizing point ib where MC = VMP. And 
the equilibrium quantity and price for each borrower, considering 
no interest rate ceilings and liquidity constraints, iS L* and 
r for the ribky borrower and L* and r for the leSS riSky 
1
 2 . 2 
borrower. 
With effective guarantee programs, the ribk-burden in the 
priority Sector ib reduced and thub, lending rateS to riSky 
borrowers decrease's which reSult in an increase going to them. 
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Figure II-1. CREDIT ALLOCATION FOR RISKY BORROWER AND 
LESS RISKY BORROWER, WITHOUT GUARANTEE 
8 
Thib ib becaube the ribk premium which created the difference 
between r and r ib eliminated. The guarantee bhiftb the MC of 
1 2 
ribky borrowers to MC'. In effect, ribky borrowerb become com-
1 
petitive with the leSb ribky borrowerb. Figure II-2 illubtrateb 
the Situation. The decreabe in MC of riSky borrowers increased 
the amount of loan to L' which ib equal to L*. Thib SuggebtS 1 2 
competitiveness of and elimination of biaS againbt the ribky 
borrowerb. 
Suppobe, however, that the lender hab a liquidity 
conbtraint, Such that available loanable funds ib only L* plub 
L* (referred to ab L). Then bankb would allocate L Such/ that 
2 
MC = MC . Since MC iS lower than MC , then banks would Service 
1 2 2 1 
the leSS ribky borrower first before the riSky borrower. 
Thib means that with L, banks would btill charge the interebt 
rateS r and r even with a guarantee and thuS, there would be 
1 2 
no increase in the amount of credit to the ribky borrower. To 
increabe the amount of loanb to the leSb riSky borrower means 
that L* have to decrease to L'. Thib ib pobbible if an 
2 . 2 
interebt rate bubbidy equal to abc ib paid to the bank (bee 
Figure II-3). The interebt bubbidy decreabeb the lending cobt to 
the riSky borrower and bhiftb MC to MC'. In effect, loanb 
1 1 
to the riSky borrower increase to L'. This increabe ib equal 
1 
to the decreabe in loanb to the leSb ribky borrower (L* - L'). 
2 2 
Decreasing loanb to the leSb ribky borrowers iS not 
cobtlebb. It bhould be noted that the lebb ribky borrowerb are 
the bank'b prime or regular clientb and it would be difficult for 
g 
Figure II-2. CREDIT ALLOCATION FOR RISKY BORROWER AND 
LESS RISKY BORROWER, WITH A GUARANTEE 
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Figure II-3. CREDIT ALLOCATION OF RISKY BORROWER AND LESS RISKY 
BORROWER WITH LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINT AND WITH GUARANTEE 
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the bank to turn them down. To maintain long-term relations with 
clients, it iS expected that they would usually Service their old 
clients firSt before Servicing a new client. Under thiS 
Situation, there may be no increase in loanS to riSky borrowers 
even with a guarantee or the amount of SubSidy needed would be 
higher. 
The above findings SuggeSt the need for additional loanable 
funds to fully realize the effect of a guarantee for institutions 
with liquidity constraint. There are two wayS of achieving thiS: 
one iS through rediScounting or Selling of loan paperb and the 
other iS through more extensive deposit mobilization. 
The effect of rediScounting or Selling loan paperb iS 
illustrated aS Figure II-2. RediScounting loan papers occurs 
when banks liquify or Secure funds from either the Central Bank 
or the guarantee programs by "Selling" the guaranteed loanS. In 
thiS caSe, there maybe an increase in the amount of loanS to the 
riSky borrower without a decrease in loanS to the leSS riSky 
borrower. Hence, leSb riSky borrowers are not adversely 
affected. And, no SubSidy iS paid to the bank. The additional 
funds, however, come mainly from government funds and not the 
bank's own fundS. 
On th,e other hand, if additional funds were met through 
deposit mobilization (See ACPC 1988), banks would be uSing 
their own fundS for lending and substitution of bank fundS by 
government fundb aS well ab interest rate SubSidy ib 
eliminated. The above implications SuggeSt that a credit 
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guarantee can be an effective- meanS of increasing credit 
to the priority Sector under an effective deposit 
mobilization Scheme. In a nutshell, deposit mobilization 
would be a by-product of an effective guarantee Scheme Since 
banks would exert extra effort in increasing loanfe to the 
priority Sectorb. 
The appropriateness of the deSign and implementation of 
guarantee. SchemeS is, however, alSo crucial to the effectiveness 
of the programs. Hence, even with an effective deposit 
mobilization the downward Shift in the MC curve may be Small 
compared to what the designers of the program expects. There are 
Several reaSonS why this can happen. FirSt, there is a coSt of 
participation in the guarantee programs (e.g., supervision and 
monitoring coSt, guarantee fees, additional paperworks due to 
additional requirements of the Guarantee Board, etc.). 
Second, banks may perceive a "post-exnauStion cost.• That 
iS the coSt of collection and the coSt of foreclosure and 
claiming for guarantee in caSe of a default. 
Third, the effectiveness of guarantee programs IS reduced 
due to the moral hazard effect. This may alSo be referred to aS 
the "incentive effect", which brings out the "dole-out" mentality 
among borrowers. That is, because riSky borrowers are aware that 
the government are »backing-up" their loans, they may have more 
incentive to default. Moral hazard is also possible among 
-financial institutions. In their caSe, they may liquify riSkier 
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guaranteed loan's while ube their own funds for the le'sS riSky 
loanS. 
On the baSiS of the above dibcubsionb, it iS hypothesized 
that . under certain circum'stanceS guarantee programs can help 
increase the amount of credit to the priority bectorb. This iS 
called the "additionality" hypothesis. 
There are three possible additionality Situation's that could 
occur. Firbt, that there iS an increabe in formal credit to 
agriculture at the expenSe of the non-agricultural activities. 
Under thi's Situation, the additionality occurs becauSe of a 
substitution in the allocation of loanable fund's. For a 
substitution to occur an interest bubbidy haS to be paid to the 
bank. If the bubbidy payment iS taken from income taxeb then the 
guarantee program becomes a guarantee cum tax 'subsidy Scheme. 
The Second, additionality cabe occurs when there ib an 
increase in loanb to the priority sector's through a guarantee 
program with rediScounting without a corresponding decrease in 
loanb to the non-priority Sector. In thib cabe, there ib net 
additionality but thib increabe come's mainly from government 
fundb.. In effect Substitution albo occurs where government 
fundb 'substitute for bank fund's. 
The third cabe happens when there ib an increabe in 
agricultural loanb through a guarantee with depobit mobilization. 
AS in the previous caSe, there iS net additionality 'since loan's 
to the non-priority Sector it? not affected. The increabe, 
however, comeb from the bankb'. own fundb.. Hence, no bubbtitution 
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takeS place. Among the additlonality ca'seS, this caSe iS the 
ideal 'scheme because it implie's banking institution's initiative 
in lending to priority Sector's. 
To teSt the additionality hypothesis, the following 
indicators are used. FirSt, the ratio of riSky loanS (i.e., in 
this caSe agricultural loanS) to the total loan portfolio of 
banking institutions or the ratio of guaranteed loan to total 
agricultural loanS of banking institution. With the guarantee 
program, theSe proportions Should have been increasing. In a 
croSS-Section analysis of banks, both ratios Should be higher for 
banks participating on the guarantee program than for the non-
par ticipantS. TheSe meaSureS, however, only indicate the degree 
of participation of banks in lending to agriculture and in 
guarantee programs but not their willingness to invest their own 
funds for agricultural activities. 
A Second indicator i's the ratio of agricultural loanS to 
deposits of banking institutions. Similarly, this ratio Should 
alSo have been increasing. if banks' loanable fundS are Sourced 
mainly from depo'sitS, an increasing ratio SuggeStS willingness of 
banks to invest their funds in agriculture. On the other hand, 
if loanable fundS are not taken mainly from deposits (e.g., 
government fundS), then this ratio would only roughly reflect 
whether the increase in formal credit to agriculture iS due to 
banks* own fund's. A better mea'sure, however, iS the ratio of 
rediScounted agricultural loanS to the total agricultural loanS 
or the proportion of the rediScounted guaranteed loanS to the 
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total loanS guaranteed. An increa'se in theSe ratios would imply 
that bank's have been ubing the guarantee programb ab a liquidity 
bource. In contrast, a decrease implieb that the guarantee 
programs have been buccebbful in encouraging bankb to lend their 
own fundS to agricultural activities. 
III. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE GUARANTEE PROGRAMS 
There are four guarantee programb currently available to the 
private banking byStem. They are: (1) the Guarantee Fund for 
Small and Medium Enterprises (GFSME); (2) the Industrial 
Guarantee and Loan Fund (IGLF); (3) the Quedan Guarantee Program 
(QGP); and (4) the Crop Inburance Program (CIP). Recently, fundb 
from the various SCPb have been conbolidated under the 
Comprehenbive Agricultural Loan Fund (CALF). Thib fund provided 
additional guarantee resources for the existing guarantee 
programs. 
1. The GFSME 
The program waS established in February 1984 to encourage 
banking institutions to lend their own fundS to Small and medium 
bize-enterpriSeS engaged in either production or processing. The 
program operates under Several SubSyStemS. 
(a) Accreditation SubSyStem 
ThiS SubSybtem evaluates the financial institutions that 
will grant loanS under the program. 
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(b) Interest Rate SubSidy Subsystem 
ThiS SubSyStem ServeS aS a vehicle by which the coSt of 
borrowing iS regulated while providing a reasonable Spread to 
lending institutions. 
(c) Liquidity SubSyStem 
ThiS SubSyStem enables financial institutions to 
liquify their loan portfolio by Selling loan papers to 
GFSME. ThiS mechanism haS Similar features to the 
Bank rediScounting window only that the loan papers 
at par but the 15 percent riSk iS retained by the bank. 
(d) Mortgage SubSyStem 
ThiS SubSyStem acts aS a Secondary market which 
trading of loan papers among participating institutions 
investors. 
(e) Insurance SubSyStem 
ThiS SubSyStem is intended to minimize lending riS 
GFSME aSSumeS at moSt 85 percent of credit riSk in lend 
eligible borrowers. 
2. The IGLF 
The program iS a revolving fund established in 1952, which 
provides both financing and guarantees for cottage, Small and 
medium Sized industrial and agro-induStrial enterprises. There 
are three possible financing SchemeS under the program: 
Central 
are Sold 
promotes 
and other 
kS. Here 
ing to its 
17 
(a) Special Time Deposit (STD) 
ThiS program provides full financing for loanS approved 
under the program. 
(b) Combination of STD and Guarantee 
ThiS program provides for financing and guarantees a portion 
of the deficiency in collateral requirements. 
(c) Straight Guarantee 
ThiS Scheme applies when banks utilize their own funds for 
LoanS eligible under the IGLF. In thiS caSe, a guarantee up to a 
maximum of 85 percent iS applied. 
(3) The QGP 
ThiS program iS operated by the Quedan Board which wab 
established in June 1978 primarily to Supplement the capital 
requirement of buSineSSmen engaged in marketing of .grain's and 
other baSic food commodities. The program operates under three 
leverage modeS: 
(a) Credit Guarantee Mode 
ThiS mode is similar to the Straight guarantee Scheme of 
IGLF. It doeS not provide financing but guarantees, a maximum of 
80 percent of loanS made with banks' own fundS. There are; three 
financing programs under thiS mode: (1) the Quedan for Food 
Traders and ProceSSorS (FTP); (2) the Quedan for Farmer's Group 
(FG); and (3) the Quedan for Sugar. 
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(b) Credit-Sharing Mode 
ThiS mode iS a fund partnership Scheme where the Quedan 
Board provideb 50 percent of the financing and 100 percent 
guarantee on the other 50 percent provided by the lending 
inbtitutionS. In this mode interebt rateb ceilings are Set by 
the Board. The financing programb under thib mode are: (1) the 
Quedan financing for market retailers (MRP); and (b) the Quedan 
financing for food and agriculture marketing enterprises (FAME). 
(c) Credit Sourcing Mode 
ThiS mode provides 100 percent financing to eligible 
projects. In thib mode, the Quedan Board hab a tie-up with the 
Land Bank and IGLF. The programs under thiS mode are: (1) the 
Quedan Financing for Intensive Rice Production and Expanded Corn 
Production (IRPP/ECP); and (2) the Livelihood Financing for 
Employees (LIFE). 
(4) The CIP 
ThiS program waS established in May 1981. It differs from 
the other guarantee programs in that it doeb not directly provide 
guarantees to loanS granted by financial institutions. Rather it 
provides protection to farmers, in particular rice and corn 
farmers, by insuring farm lobbeb due to natural calamities. 
Therefore, lending inbtitutionb are indirectly provided guarantee 
cover bince the program will cubhion them from the effects of 
loan defaults due to crop failure. This occurs because the 
proceeds of the insurance claims of borrowing farmers are applied 
directly against the borrower's outstanding loan. 
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In Sum what iS common to all theSe guarantee programs 
iS the objective of developing and Supporting lending 
institutions initiatives in granting loanS to the priority 
Sector. An important point to note iS that the various guarantee 
programs have Several features, and providing guarantees for 
loanS made by financial institutions to priority SectorS iS only 
one feature. The other features include among others a 
liquidity mechanism, credit Sharing arrangements, and interest 
rate 'subsidies, and they could Serve aS the main attraction 
of the program to a lender rather than the guarantee itSelf. 
The termS and conditions of the loanS eligible for guarantee 
or insurance under each guarantee schemes are Summarized in Table 
I. Except for IGLF, all other program's cater to the agricultural 
Sector. The borrowing rate for GFSME and IGLF are fixed for the 
term of the loan and determined by the Guarantee Board. In 
contrast, under the QGP and the CIP interest rate's are baSed on 
/ 
the prevailing commercial rate's. 
IV. UTILIZATION OF GUARANTEE FUNDS 
Data available from the various guarantee programs Show that 
the amount of guaranteed loanS haS been increasing in real 
termS. This i's revealed by the positive annual growth rateS for 
all guarantee programs (Table 2-4) . GFSME Showed the highe'st 
growth rate (113.6%). 
The tableS further reveal that the bulk of loanS guaranteed 
have been originated by commercial banks (KBS) . Thi's iS followed 
20 
«> ji ™ * I si J
 5
 -
I 
b 
& 
1'J! 
I* 
s -SI'S 
s ^  
.Mil 
! i f I "fc g eS 
I! 
§i = Sis & 
si 
it 
. •S % 
r s 
| 1 
B'-i 
JS s ® 
11 
IJ 
II 
X 
§ I 
I 
a 
15
 ^  g-2 
° s 
1 & •a E '•£'£. jj 
is 1 .a ; 
cs 
3 | „ .. a.E.'ssg-^  ^ — -s & 
f.| J 3 E a 3 all J K o ff. • n H u »--— a .2 — "3 13 S -S X, IS 
< 
E ,3 .3 a ^ • ^  *S "5 
m s 
•3 » I 12 ™ , 5
 s
 , s: 
j J 5 .s il J J s 
g 
I 'ifse'sT 
9 g •3 &. 
2 e 
II 
-
 s
 3 
11 I 
15 s 
2 - Sl
s
-I § 2 "g f „ a
1
 -2 ^  "" ~ S -S •s
 s
|3 = -; M .3 S -•-> ^  ® P -3 o II g 
1 I 
r § 
• I a 
I I 
3 i . 
— 5 • 
j g 
III! 
3 * 
I :| | 
-1 £. 3 s 
.ISa.3 
^ "S , 
r— § 3 i "S _ I "E E 
i -i "S s £ 
i * n U g -g S -g -
I i i I - » 
! _ 3 " 3. 1 ^ S 
, 3 £ £ „ 3; 1 ! J 3 5 i£. % ^ : 
!J* 
I 
s s; s £ a, 
E 
£ 
M = 
21 
-a 
.1' 
IP " M % 
e 
a a. 
.-s -g 
. H V • 
: x : £ 
w* 
£ « 
i I s 
[ s 
Ls 
Ji J3 
:s a 8a Is 
if i . 
~ I 2 Tt * • .3 i 
J I . 
al 
I & n I 
1 1 t ,§? SS S .S "S 3. .8 
g 
5=1. 
jj 1 
<3 „
_g .s a js u 
si • S 
3 -s s 8 
JK-. a-s I j «. 
•£ .3 "
S 
-n ~54 5 S fe -I J! 
£ p 
= s, 
B S 
§ _ si; 
i a 5 • ! s <s s • 
"S -s u a s •s 
1 o 
s 
z 
!-.£ fa 
ilsl 
a. J S 
-S 
s> 
B ^ .S 
1 
J 
QJ f 
£ 
> -3 '3 
.. & -S -
i> I" i 5 a « 
m' 
"5 3 s 
a .a 
fr.-
5
 3 
i. 
111.! 
s s ^ • s s ° a, g : 
a sf J- f ; 
£ I s; S i 
.J'J.IIJf 
1 •s g fa 3
-=3 3.1 ! JS £ s ; s | 3 -3 2 .? | s - „ . • 
- ^  S " .2 ' 
s b .s 1 | ~Z 
A alt: 
i i — "i
 15 
| s«1 ^  J §5 
~B 
^ 8 . 
S I 
£ 
S I 
si 
% s i 
§ s a :: 
i
s •s 9 
i 1 
tl 15 
.. .S 
5 m 
"S 
8 S = 
£
s
 J 
3 a -i s s 
! .3 
:
 iS 
; 3 -
; .3 5 
i s 
SJ? 
s .3 • s s fa 3 . !"a; 
s s 
a si 
'1 
h i 
• I" J i 
i -I L 5 
If ! 
JS 
-5 5 £ „ S, 
s ^ 
s 
S £ 
-s = - s 2 3 
s s 
te B 
2, '2 Ja • 3 "o 
g, to 
g s 
s i. 
I-II 
"B , 
" S
1 
If 
J 3 -H S 
•s 
•li 1 •:, 
13 s 
1 - a t; 
lis if 
^ . %M 111 t ! 
22 
<u 
CP -
<0 
IH 
<D > 
oo 
<Ti 
O 
S 
op 
•P £ 
£ A 
< •— 
1—^  
1 
s: — i CN 1 VO 11 
<0 -P • i » • 1 • II 
3 J 9)4J 1 cn I en II 
C o -p e i CTv cn 1 rH II 
C in (d < 1 rH 1 rH II 
< u « — 1 1 
i <N 00 1 O II 
i i • * 1 s II 
i <*> i kD ro 1 rH II 
i i in 
i i 
i i 1 II 
1 * A | m 1 • II 
i 4-> E 1 • • 1 rH II 
i e a i CM a\ 1 CN II 
VD i < — i iH 
00 i i 
CK i i 
rH i i a\ rH 
1 OP I * * 1 Si II 
1 1 rH OO 1 Si II 
1 1 V£> ^ . 1 rH I  
1 0 1 
1 2 1 CM CN 1 II 
1 
1 •
in ro 1 oo II 
V 
I 
I I Si Si 
1 I • • I s> II 
1 OP 1 in in 1 <S> II 
1 1 
1 1 
in 1 rH II 
1 1 
ES 1 Si I  
1 -P S l • * 1 • II 
in 1 S ft 1 rH CTl 1 SI II 00 1 (3, —^ I rH 1 CN II 
<Tv 
i-H 1 1 VO 
1 1 * • 1 <S II CN 
in 
ts 
rn 
r-
CM 
in 
CO 
I Si II 
I rH II 
I r- ii I in ii 
I ts II 
I O || 
I 1—1 II 
I 00 I  
I • ii 
I -=}• ii 
1 H IH 1 ro s U-l 1 * • Si II en CO df> 1 rH oo Si II Pw "D 1 in H II O rH a; « TS 1 >1 3 oo • I * • SJ rH l 
0 1 in r - i CN II <0 <0 O 
2 1 r-H II 4J 3 X 00 1 (0 tH 0} <71 
c i T3 XI rH 
0 1 a> (U •rl | 4H &4 >H -P 1 0 a) 
a i 3 i 14H 3 C -P 1 cu 0 
•H -H | v . , J o jn -P 1 jtn < u .tn PQ C J^ 1 JI) m jn o (0 H <0 C 1 m Q m O o 
>1 CQ H I 04 K E-i Ui 
e 
o 
SH 
e 
nj 
u 
Cn 
O 
sh 
a 
a> 
- P 
cn 
C 
•H 
-P 
(0 
Oj 
•H 
o 
4J 
S-l 
<0 
a 
o 
24 
vo 
00 
ON 
cO ^ 
C5 LJT5 
CO 
Lif^  
(M 
A 
CO 5V? CO 
M St. 
U3 IA 
ti? CO 
C5C? 
m C3 
fcrt LCS 
tc O 
l_C"P 
00 
0) 
rH 
§ 
<3 fi=! 

a / 
Table 4. GUARANTEED LOANS GRANTED BY TYPES OF 
BANKING INSTITUTION AND BY PROGRAM, QGP, 1979 
(IN REAL TERMS, 1972=100) 
Years KB 6 PDB6 RBs Totals 
(in million pesos) 
1979 
FTP 2.9 0.4 3.3 
1980 
FTP 4.9 1.4 6.3 
1981 
FTP 17.5 0.5 1.7 19.8 
FG 0.2 0.2 
Total 17.7 0.5 1.7 20 
1982 
FTP 47.0 3.9 1.8 52.7 
FG 0.3 0.3 
Total 47.0 3.9 1.8 53.0 
1983 
FTP 82.5 3.1 1.3 86.8 
FG 0 
Total 82.5 3.1 1.3 86.8 
1984 
FTP 48.7 0.1 0.5 49.4 
FG 0 
MRP 0.8 0.3 0.1 1.3 
Total 49.5 0.4 0.6 50.7 
1985 
FTP 64.3 0.5 1.6 66.4 
FG 0.2 0.2 
MRP 2.4 2.4 1.0 5.8 
Total 66.7 2.9 1.0 5.8 
1986 
FTP 87.2 6.3 2.3 95.8 
FG 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.6 
MRP 0.8 4.0 1.8 6.6 
Total 117.1 10.5 4.4 103.0 
Ave. annual growth rates (%) 
b/ 
FTP" 62.6 66.0 28.4 61.8 
o/ 
FG (10.9) - - 20.1 
& 
MRP - 265.1 324.3 125.3 
All Programs 69.6 54.5 40.8 63.5 
Source of data: Quedan Board 
a/ 
do not include loans granted by savings banks, 
b/ 
Quedan for Food/Traders Program 
c/ 
Quedan for Farmers Group 
Quedan for Market Retailers Program 
by the private development bankb (PDB's) . The rural bankb (RBb) 
originated a minimal amount of guaranteed loanb. 
The above trend hab been obberved for all yearb under the 
GFSME and QGP programb. For the IGLF, the non-bank financial 
inbtitutionb (NBFlb) granted the bulk of guaranteed loanb during 
the earlier yearb (1978-82). Starting in 1983, however, KBb 
originated mobt of the guaranteed loan's. 
The above finding ib not burpri'sing 'since KBb represented 
mobt of the accredited bank's. KBb compribe about 50 percent of 
the total number of accredited inbtitutionb under GFSME, and 60 
percent under IGLF. Although only 20 percent of the accredited 
inbtitutionb under QGP are KBb, they have, however, originated 
C 
bigger loanb averaging P1.71M compared to RBb whobe loan bize 
average only P20,000. 
Under the GFSME and IGLF programb average loan bize fallb 
within the 1.0M - 2.0M bracket. Table 5 bhowb that about 90 
percent of the loanb granted under GFSME are within the 2.0 -
5.0M bracket mode. For the yearb 1985 and 1986, loanb within 
thib bize category compribe about 50 percent of the amount of and 
38 percent of the number of projectb guaranteed. On the other 
hand, loanb below P500,000 but not lebb than £200,000 compribe an 
average of 14.4 percent. In termb of average annual growth 
rateb, loan's of bize P0.5 - 2. 0M regibtered the highebt growth 
rate; followed by loan's of £2.0 - 5.0M. 
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For the IGLF program, the bulk of the loanb are within the 
P800,000 - 4.0 M bracket (Table 6). Moreover, it ib further 
obberved that over the .yearb only the bracket modeb greater than 
P
:
500,000 'showed pobitive average annual growth rate's. That ib, 
there ha's been an increase in the number of loanb belonging to 
thebe bize categories. On the other hand, loanb below P500,000 
have been decreasing in number. 
Similarly, under the QGP, loanS for the FarmerS Group have 
become unpopular among banking institution's (refer to Table 4); 
while loanb for FTP and MRP have been increabing. 
The above findings buggebt the preference of bankS for 
fairly large-Sized loanb.. 
The mobt popular investment area for GFSME iS fi'sh and 
marine, in particular prawn culture (Table 7). Within GFSME'S 
three.yearS in operation, a total of 153 loanS representing about 
54 percent - of total loanS guaranteed were in fi'sh and marine. 
Seventy- (70) percent of thebe are in prawnb. Under IGLF, 
mahufacturing ib the moSt popular investment area (Table 8). 
About 97 percent of loan's granted under the program are in the 
industrial Sector, in particular the food and food product's 
manufacturing Sub-Sector. On the other hand, mo'st loanb 
guaranteed under the QGP were from the FTP program (refer to 
Table 4)., compribing about 98. percent of loanb granted. The 
program for Farmerb Group (FG) ib the lea'st popular. It's Share 
iS negiible and in Some year's no loan's were originated under the 
-program; 
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Table 6. GUARANTEED LOANS GRANTED BY LOAN SIZE, IGLF, 1978-86 
(IN REAL TERMS 1972 = 100) 
1978 1979 
Size of Loan ( ? ) _ _ _ _ _ _ 
NO. Amount No. Amount 
(PM) (PM) 
50,000 and below 3 _ 1 
50,001 200,000 42 2.4 28 1.6 
200,000 500,000 95 19. 5 118 22. 5 
500,001 800,000 - — — _ 
800,001 2,500,000 - — _ _ 
2,500,001 - 4,000,000 - - — _ 
4,000,0001- 5,000,000 - - - -
TOTAL 140 21. 9 147 24.2 
1980 1981 
Size of Loan (P) _ _ _ _ _ _ — _ _ _ _ _ 
NO . Amount NO . Amount 
(PM) (PM) 
50,000 and below 4 0.1 ^ _ 
50,0001 200,000 19 0.9 27 1.2 
200,001 500,000 72 11. 5 49 6.1 
500,001 800,000 18 4.5 46 10.8 
800,001 2,500,000 57 34.4 98 56. 0 
2,500,001 - 4,000,000 - — — _ 
4,000,001 - 5,000,000 - - - — 
- — _ _ _ _ 
TOTAL 170 51.4 22 2 74.1 
\ 1982 1983 
Size of Loan (P) — _ _ __———_____ 
NO . Amount NO . Amount 
(PM) (PM) 
50,000 and below 
50,001 200,000 16 0.7 18 0.8 
200,001 500,000 38 4.5 34 3.5 
500,001 800,000 30 6.6 23 4.3 
800,001 2,500,000 77 42.1 85 37. 9 
2,500,001 - 4,000,000 - 0.9 8 9.3 
4,000,001 - 5,000,000 -
- — — — — _ 
TOTAL 162 54.8 169 55.1 
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continued ... Table 6 
1984 1985 
Size of Loan ( P ) 
No . Amount 
(PM) 
No. Amount 
(PM) 
50.000 and below 
50.001 - 200,000 
200,001 - 500,000 
500,001 ~ 800,000 
800,001 - 2,500,000 
2,500,001 - 4,000,000 
4,000,001 - 5,000,000 
9 
33 
27 
137 
66 
1 
0.3 
2.3 
3.3 
37.2 
40.3 
0.9 
17 
59 
41 
216 
65 
2 
0.3 
3.6 
3.6 
47.1 
34.2 
1.4 
TOTAL 273 84. 2 400 90.9 
1986 
Ave. Annual 
Growth Rates (%) 
Size of Loan (P) 
No. Amount 
(PM) 
No. Amount 
(PM) 
50,000 and below 1 0.1 (12.8) 
-
50,001 200,000 15 0.4 (12.1) (20.1) 
200,001 500,000 39 2.3 (10.5) (23.-4) 
500,001 800,000 30 3.0 8-9 a/ (6.5)b/ 
800,001 2,500,000 85 18.3 6.9 (10.0) 
2,500,001 - 4,000,000 17 8.4 103.0 b/ 74.8b/ 
4,000,001 ~ 5,000,000 - - - -
TOTAL 187 32.5 
Source of data: IGLF. 
a/ 
from 1980 - 1986 
b/ 
from 1982 - 1986 
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GUARANTEED LOANS BY INDUSTRY, IGLF, 1978-1988 
(IN REAL TERMS,1972 = 100) 
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Industry 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
No. Amt. No. Amt. No. Amt. No. Amt. No. Amt. 
(PM) (PM) (PM) (PM) (PM) 
Manufacturing 132 20.7 145 23,8 161 48.6 218 73.1 161 25.5 
Construction 1 0.2 0 0 1 0.9 0 0 0 0 
Tourism 3 0.4 2 0.4 3 0.9 2 0.5 0 0 
Other Services 4 0.6 0 0 5 1.0 2 0.5 1 0.2 
Total 
(all industry) 140 21.9 147 24.2 170 51.4 222 74.1 162 54.7 
Ave. Annual 
1983 1984 1985 1986 Growth Rate (X) 
Industry 
No. Amt. No. Amt. No. Amt. No. Amt. No. Amt. 
(PM) (PM) (PM) (PM) (PM) 
a/ 
Manufacturing 165 53.0 266 81.6 395 90,1 184 32.2 4.2 5.7 
Construction 1 0.8 0 0 1 0.2 0 0 -
Tourism 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
Other Services . 3 1.3 7 2.6 4 0.7 3 0.3 (3.5) (8.3) 
Total 
(all industry) 169 55.1 273 84.2 400 91.0 187 32.5 3.7 5.0 
Source of data: IGLF 
- less than 2% 
a/ 
see Appendix III-2 for details 
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For the CIP, the total number of farmers injured represent 
only about 14 percent of the total rice farmer's and about 20 
percent of the corn farmers in the country. The bulk of 
insurance cornels from the region wHere the crop ib popularly or 
widely grown, for instance, Region III for rice crop and Region 
XI for corn. The number of inbured farmerb for both cropb ha's 
been declining, however, the amount of coverage ha's bhown 
positive growth rateb. 
In termb of repayment performance, the GFSME and QGP 'seem to 
be doing quite well, boabting a repayment rate of more than 90 
percent. 1GLF repayment performance ib not ab imprebbive a!s 
GFSME and QGP ab repayment rateb average only about 50 percent. 
The buccebb of the guarantee program's dependb to a certain 
extent on the ability of the implementing agencieb to 'subtain 
their financial viability and credibility. The cobtb incurred in 
operating the bcheme's give borne indication's of their overall 
performance. Among the guarantee programb, the IGLF hab the 
leabt cobt per pebo incurred which amounted to P0.019 (Table 9 
11), followed by CIP (P0. 050). GFSME hab the highe'st average 
cobt per pebo (P0.11). De'spite thib, however, GFSME regibtered 
the highebt income among the three program's. Thib ib due to the 
good repayment rateb of GFSME compared to IGLF. CIP'b income on 
the other hand, wab "eaten up" by the huge amount of indemnitie's. 
Start ing in 1983, the program hab been paying, on average, more 
than 63 percent of the premium earned. Hence, even income from 
itb investment's in government becuritieb ha's been utilized to 
cover cobt. 
Table 9. GFSME COST OF DOING BUSINESS, 1984-86 
(IN REAL TERMS,1972 = 100) 
Average 
Annual 
1984 1985 1986 Growth 
Rate (%) 
1. Administrative Cost (PM) 0.7 1.5 2.4 85.2 
2. Projects Financed 
a. Number 12 57 94 179.9 
b. Amount (PM) 4.8 20.0 22.3 118.3 
3. Cost/Loan 
Cost/Project (1-2a) P 58,333 26,316 25,531 (33.8) 
Cost/Peso (1*2b) P 0.14 0.08 0.11 (11.4) 
4. Guarantee and 
Participation Fee 36,149 738,116 280,208 178.4 
Source of basic data: IGLF 
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Table 11. CIP COST OF DOING BUSINESSES, 1981-86 
(IN REAL TERMS, 1987 = 100) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 Average Annual 
Growth Rate (%) 
1. Administrative cost 4.3 7.8 8.3 6.6 6.5 6.2 7.6 
2. Policies issued (total) 
a/.. 
a. Arrount (P million) 84.0 129.9 158.0 112.8 172.4 151.0 12.4 
b. Number of farmers 108,528 180,583 220,633 156,417 186,161 141,868 12.4 
c. Number of hectares 199,333 322,916 387,527 259,030 337,976 271,137 5.5 
3. Cost/Loan 
Cost/peso (1 2a) P 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.04 (4.4) 
Cost/farmer (1 t 2b) 39.60 43.20 37.62 42.20 34.90 43.70 2.0 
Cost/hectares (1 - 2c) 21.60 24.20 21.42 25.50 19.23 22.90 1.2 
4. Ratio of claims to 
premium earned 0.25 0.83 1.56 1.84 1.51 1.71 46.9 
5. Loss ratio 0.71 1.66 2.32 2.66 2.04 2.28 26.3 
a/ 
both borrowing and self-financed farmers. 
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V. IMPACT OF GUARANTEE PROGRAMS ON SUPPLY OF CREDIT 
ThiS Section examines Some indicators to determine the 
probable effect of the guarantee programs on the Supply of credit 
to the Socially desirable Sector, in thiS caSe, agriculture. 
In absolute termS, agricultural loanS granted by banking 
institutions Showed a positive average annual growth rate for the 
yearS 1981-86 (See CB statistical Bulletin 1986). However, the 
ratio of agricultural loanS to total loanb of banking 
institutions haS Shown negative growth rateS (Table 12). ThiS 
finding indicates that despite the increase in the loan portfolio 
of bankb, agricultural loanb Seemb to be of leaSt priority to 
them. Surprisingly, thib occurred even though the volume of 
guaranteed loanb wab obberved to be increasing in real termS aS 
earlier mentioned. Of the total agricultural loanS granted by 
banking institutions, guaranteed loanS represented only an 
average Share of 2.8 percent (Table 13). ThiS Share iS, however, 
increasing. Among banks, PDBS have the largest Share of 
guaranteed loanb in their loan portfolio. RBb rank next followed 
by
 4
KBb. 
The increabe in the amount of guaranteed loanb buggeStS a 
pobitive attitude of bankb towards guarantee programs. However, 
thiS increase vib-a-vib a declining Share of agricultural loanb 
to the total loan portfolio of banking institutions indicates 
that there iS no net addition to loan granted to the agricultural 
Sector. A substitution must have occurred. In thiS caSe 
government fundS are bubbtituted for bankb' funds. 
Table 12. . PROPORTION OF AGRICULTURAL LOANS TO TOTAL LOANS, 
SELECTED BANKING INSTITUTIONS, 1981-86 (IN PERCENT) 
Ave. Ave. 
Type of Annual Propor-
Institution 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 Growth tion 
Rate 1981-86 
(*) 
KBs 7.7 6.3 6.8 7.3 9.0 6.6 (3.0) 7.3 
PDBs 19.2 19.8 8.5 15.3 12.0 13.8 (6.4) 15.1 
RBs 85.0 82.8 80.6 75.9 71.4 66.0 (4.9) 80.1 
Total a/ 
(All Banks) 9.1 8.2 8.0 8.1 12.1 7.9 (2.3) 8.9 
Source of data: TBAC-ACS Study 
CB Statistical Bulletin 
a/ 
includes SGBs, Savings Banks, SSLAS 
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Table 13. RATIO OF AGRICULTURAL. GUARANTEED LOANS TO 
AGRICULTURAL LOANS GRANTED, SELECTED FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS, 1981-86 (IN PERCENT) 
Ave. Ave. 
Financial Annual Ratio 
Institution 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 Growth 1981-86 
Rate 
(%) 
KBs 1.0 1.4 2.1 1.5 2.4 4.2 (33.2) 2.1 
PDBs 42.2 77.8 12.0 59.8 58.4 25.8 (0.9) 46.0 
RBs 1.0 2.0 1.2 1.8 2.6 3.8 16.1 2.2 
Total 
(All Banks) 1.7 2.7 2.1 2.2 3.1 5.0 24.1 2.8 
Source of data: GFSME, QGFB, CB 
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Unfortunately, there ib no information on agricultural loan's 
granted by banking institution's . from their own fundb or 
agricultural loanb redibcounted, to determine whether bankb have 
been ubing the guarantee programb ab a "liquidity window". 
Comparing agricultural loan's granted with the depobitb 
generated by banking inbtitutionb might give a rough idea on the 
extent of utilization of bank fund's. Table 14 revealb that the 
bhare of agricultural loanb to depobitb of banking inbtitutionb 
hab been declining, from 26.0 percent in 1981, to 13.9 percent in 
1986, or an annual average decreabe of 12.0 percent. Thi's 
happened despite the increabe in real depobitb. Real depobitb 
bhowed an average annual growth rate of 29.3 percent for a 6-
year period, 1981-86 ('see CB Statibtical Bulletin 1987). Among 
bankb, the ratio of agricultural loan's to depobitb albo bhowed 
negative annual, growth rateb. Only PDBb bhowed a pobitive 
average annual growth rate (3.5%) but thib ib minimal compared to 
the 43.4 percent increabe in real depobit for the 'same period. 
The bhare of agricultural loanb to depobit average only 20.7 
percent. Among bankb, rural bankb allocate the highebt 
proportion of depobitb to agricultural loanb (113%) while KBb and 
PDBb allocate only 20 percent. 
The only, available data bo far that would directly 
determine the amount of agricultural loan's redibcounted ib from 
the Comparative Bank Survey (Table 15). The table revealb that 
of the total guaranteed loanb granted by participating bankb for 
all the guarantee programb in 1986, 97.3 percent have been 
42 
Table 14. PROPORTION OF AGRICULTURAL LOANS TO DEPOSITS, 
RANKING INSTITUTIONS, 1981-86 (IN PERCENT) 
Ave. Ave. 
Banking Ratio Annual 
Institution 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1981- Growth 
1986 Rate 
(%) 
KBs 23.9 22.4 19.3 17.6 16.7 12.9 18.8 (11-6) 
PDBs 23.5 20.3 14.2 15.1 12.7 27.9 19.0 3.5 
RBs 153.5 143.7 128.4 101.2 92.0 59.4 113.0 (17.3) 
a/ 
Total 26.0 24.7 21.9 20.8 16.9 13.9 20.7 (12.0) 
Source of data: TBAC-ACS Study 
CB Statistical Bulletin 
a/ 
includes SGQs, Savings Banks, SSLAS 
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Table 15. LOANS GRANTED BY LOAN PROGRAM* BY GUARANTEE AND BY 
BANKING I N S T I T U T I O N , PARTICIPATING B A N K S , 1986 
(IN MILLION PESOS) 
Straight Guarantee Rediscounts Both Programs 
Program KB X PDBs % RBs % All X KB % FDBs % RBs % All % KBs X PDBs % HBs X All % 
Banks Banks 
IGLF 0 0 0 9.6 20,2 3.8 7.9 0 13.4 28.1 9.6 20,2 3.8 7,9 0 13.4 26.1 
GFSHE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
QGF 0 0.3 0,6 0 0.3 0.6 11.2 23.5 21.0 44.1 0 32,2 67.6 11.2 23.5 21.3 44.7 0 32.50 68.2 
CIP 0 0 - 0.99 2,0 0.99 2.0 0 0.8 1,6 0 0.0 1.6 0 0.0 1,6 0,99 2.0 1.8 3.7 
TOTAL 0 0.3 0.6 0.99 2.0 1,2 2.5 20.8 43.7 25.6 53.6 0 46.3 97.3 20.8 43.7 25.8 54.2 0.99 2.0 47.7 100 
Source of data: Comparative Bank Study Survey, 1987 
il 
include combination program but was not included in the table because no bank in the sample availed of the program, 
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rediScounted. Only 2.5 percent utilized fundS from the banking 
institutions. 
VI. BANK ASSESSMENT OF AND EXPERIENCE WITH GUARANTEE PROGRAMS 
Data from the Comparative Bank Study Survey 1987 ('see 
Lamberte 1988 and Magno 1988 for detail's on the Study) , revealed 
that only a few bank's or branches participate in guarantee 
programs. In particular, only 17 (31.5%) of the 54 bankS 
interviewed have participated in the program. The moSt common 
reaSon given by respondent's, especially KBS and PDBS, for not 
participating iS that there are no borrowers/ applicant's in their 
Service area. For RB's, the mo'st common reaSon given for non-
participation iS that they were not being accredited. 
For the participating bank's, various problems have been 
cited. The moSt common problem cited is the longer, time Spent in 
Servicing guaranteed loan's due to cumbersome and voluminous 
requirement's. Table 16 'shows that more man-hour's are u'sed in 
Servicing a guaranteed loan than a regular loan * The GFSME 
revealed the highest man-hour difference among guaranteed 
program's in Servicing a guaranteed loan, an average of 308.3 
percent. The leaSt man-hour's of difference is observed in the 
CIP with an average of 20 percent. 
The greater man-hourS needed to Service a guaranteed loan i's 
mainly attributed to the Screening., loan processing and loan -
monitoring activities. For instance, under IGLF, Screening; of 
guaranteed loan's takeS 93.6 percent more man-hour's than a regular 
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Table 16. AVERAGE DIFFERENCE IN MAN-HOURS SPENT ON GUARANTEED LOANS 
AGAINST REGULAR LOANS, BY PROGRAM AND BY LENDING ACTIVITY, 
SELECTED BANKING INSTITUTIONS, 17 BANKS (IN PERCENT PER ANNUM) 
Program/Act ivity 
Banking Institution 
B/ 
KBS PDBS RBs All Pr 
Banks (t-test) 
3 8 11 
143.3 75.0 a/ 93.6 0.40 
76.7. 65.6 68.6 0.90 
62.5 3.6 33.4 0.01 
20.0 99 . 4 77. 7 0. 60 
302. 5 243. 6 278.3 
= = = = = - - - = = — — — — — 
3 5 8 
176. 7 40.0 a/ 91.2 0.10. 
76 . 7 105.0 94. 4 0. 70 
33.3 15.0 21.9 0.40 
20. 0 150.0 101. 2 0. 60 
306.7 310.0. 308.7 
= = = = = . = = = = = = = = = = ' 
4 8 . 12 
176.-7 31.2 70.9 0.02 
62. 5 21.9 ' 35.4 0.10 
37. 5 3.1 14.6 0.10 
17. 5 0 5.8 0.30 
— - — 
29 4.2 56.2 126.7 
= = = = = = = = = = ~ S = — 
1 3 4 
0 -3.3 -2.5 0 . 60 
a/ 0- 10.0 7.5 0.90 
0 6.7 5.0 1.20 
0 13.,3 10. 0 1.00 
1 30.0 20. 0 
IGLF 
N o " o f Respondents 
Screening 
Processing 
Credit Investigation 
Loan Monitoring 
Total, (all activities) 
GFSME 
N o " o f Respondents 
Screening 
Processing 
Credit Investigation 
Loan Monitoring 
Total (all activities) 
QGP 
NO. of Respondents 
Screening 
. processing ; 
Credit Investigation 
Loan Monitoring 
Total (all activities) 
CIP 
NoT of Respondents 
Screening 
Processing 
Credit investigation 
Loan Monitoring _ 
Total, (all activities) 
SOURCE 
Activity 
Program 
Error ; 
Total 
Analysis, of Variance (ANOVA) 
SUM OF SQUARES D.F. MEAN SQUARE F-RATIO 
136 55.137 
4054.557 
4288.466 
21998.159 
3 
3 
9 
15 
4551.712 
13 51 * 519 
47 6.496 
9. 552 
2. 836 
PROB 
3.700E-03 
0.0983 
Source of data;: Comparative Bank Study Survey", 1987. 
—^no participants 
—/test of difference among means 
test .of difference among means (all banks). 
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loan, 68.6 percent more in loan processing and 77.7 percent more 
in loan monitoring. Under GFSME, 'screening takeS 91.2 percent 
more man-hour's, 94.4 percent for loan processing and 101.2 
percent for loan monitoring. TheSe time difference's among 
activities are statistically Significant at a 5 percent level of 
Significance. 
Between KBS and PDBS, no statistical 'significant differences 
among activities were obtained except in credit investigation of 
IGLF loanS and in Screening of QGP loan. In both caSeS, KB's 
Spend more time than PDBS. 
In general, more man-hour's are Spent in Servicing a 
guaranteed loan, in particular Screening, loan processing and 
monitoring activities, due to the following reason's: FirSt, the 
numerous requirement's and paperwork needed. For instance, 
feasibility studies, project plans, audited financial statements 
etc. Second, banks are mandated by the Central Bank or the 
Guar antee Board to cloSely Supervise guaranteed loans due to a 
greater possibility of credit being diverted to other uSeS. 
Third, banks want to be certain that the loanS accepted for 
guarantee will be approved by the Guarantee Board. Hence, they 
have to abide by the ruleS and regulations of the Board. And 
lastly, banks want to make 'sure that borrowers will not default 
on loan's becauSe if this happens, they will be blacklisted by the 
concerned government agencies, not to mention the potential 
financial loSSe's. Hence, banks have to be meticulous in 
approving guaranteed loan's. 
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De'spite the problemb encountered by the bank's, participation 
in the program's i's btill de'sirable. The benefit mo'st commonly 
cited by bank's ib that guarantee programb portray an image of 
btability to the bank. Thib ib becaube accredited bankb are 
choben by the guarantee inbtitutionb ba'sed on certain rigoroub 
banking criteria. For inbtance, the accredited bank 'should have 
no arrearage's with the Central Eank and that the arrearage's on 
total loanb outbtanding 'should not be greater than 10 percent. 
Moreover, the bank bhould have no deficiencieb in reberveb on 
depobit liabilities and 'should have a bound and efficient 
management. Given the'se criteria, the public may perceive that 
an accredited bank mu'st be a good bank. 
VII. A CASE STUDY ON GFSME 
Thi's bection further di'scu's'se's the rebponbe by lending 
institution's to the guarantee program's. Here we 'specifically 
analybe the factor's that affect the decibion of financial 
inbtitutionb whether to keep their own fundb tied up in the loan 
(referred to ab warehoube) or to liquify their guaranteed loanb. 
The only available data on which to conduct thib analybib ib 
from GFSME; hence, the choice of the program. The data conbi'st 
of the character i'sticb of loan's guaranteed by GFSME bince the 
'start of the program (i.e., February 1984) to March 1988. Among 
otherb are: (1) the btatu's of the loan; (2) the type of 
bu'sine's's; (3) the location of bubineb's; (4) the originating 
bank; (5) intere'st rate; and (6) loan 'size. Thebe variable's 
were the major categorie's of the observation's. 
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The estimating equation iS expressed ab: 
WAREL = f(FISH, LIVESTOCK, PDB, OBANK, LUZON, VISAYAS, 
interest, loan bize, default) 
where, WAREL a dummy variable on the bankb' decibion to 
warehoube a guaranteed loan where WAREL = 1 if the loan iS 
warehoused and 0 otherwise. WAREL = 0 meanS that bankS
1 
fundb are not tied up to the loan. That iS, the loan could 
either be Sold to GFSME, prepaid and withdrawn by the 
borrowers or pending for approval. 
FISH*and LIVESTOCK = are dummy variables on type of 
buSineSS where FISH = 1 if the loan ib invested on 
fiSh and marine and 0 otherwise. 
LIVESTOCK = 1 if loan iS on livestock and poultry and 0 
otherwise. 
PDB and OBANKS = are dummy variables on bank type of where 
PDB = 1 if a private development bank (PDBS) and 0 
otherwise. OBANKS = 1 if any financial institutions 
other than KBS. 
LUZON and VISAYAS = are dummy variables on location of 
buSineSS where LUZON = 1 if the buSineSS iS located in 
Luzon and 0 otherwise. VISAYAS = 1 if the buSineSS iS 
located in ViSayaS, and otherwise. 
Interest = nominal annual interest . rate on loanS. ThiS 
variable iS actually a proxy .for loan maturity Since 
interest rateS vary not acroSS loanS- but acroSS time. 
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Loan 'size = categorization variable where 
1 < P500,000 
2 500,001 - 1.0M 
3 1. 01M 2. 0M 
4 2.01M 5. 0M 
5 < 5. 01M 8. 0M 
default = dummy variable on default where def = 1 if loan 
defaulted, 0 otherwise„ 
A logit model wab u'sed to estimate thi's equation and Table 17 
prebentb the re'sult's. 
The type of bu'sineb's i's not 'significant in the model. Thi's 
implieb that bank's do not u'se thib factor in deciding to 
warehoube or not to warehoube the loan paper's. 
The variable on bank type bhowed negative coefficient's for 
both PDBb and OBANK though only the coefficient on PDBb ib 
'significant. The negative coefficients 'suggest that financial 
inbtitutionb except KBb, do not tie up their fundb in guaranteed 
loanb. Thib finding bupportb the earlier contention that bankb 
conbider guarantee programb a's a liquidity window. Thib appearb 
to be the cabe with PDB's and RBb. In another tebt of the model, 
ubing KBb in'stead of PDBb, the coefficient for KBb wab pobitive 
and 'statistically bignificant (bee Table 18) . Thib meanb that 
only KBb, among bankb prefer to warehoube guaranteed loan's. 
There could be variou's rea'son's for thib. One pob'sible reabon ib 
that KBb have more loanable fundb than other financial 
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Tab Table 17. ESTIMATES OF FACTORS AFFECTING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS' 
DECISION TO WAREHOUSE A GUARANTEED LOAN (MODEL 1) 
Variable C o e f f i c i e n t Std . Error Prob. 
C o n s t a n t 9.11394 2 .34904 0.000 
FISH 0.18638 0 .41803 0.656 
LIVESTOCK 0.22327 0 .43108 0.605 
PDBs -0,14917 0 .33616 0.001* 
OBANKS -0.81191 . 0 .55256 0 . 142 
LUZON 1.09485 0 .53876 0.042** 
VISAYAS 1.56464 0 .57854 0.007* 
Interest -0.56449 0 .14365 0.000* 
Loan size -0.21717 0 .12744 0.088*** 
Default -2.34975 0 .94175 0.013** 
Log Likelihood ratio = 1 5 2 . 0 0 3 * 
Number of observations 285 
Cases wi th WAREL = 1 1 58 
Cases with WAR EL - 0 127 
Source of data: M a g n o , M. (1985). An Analysis of the Risk-
Reducing Programs in the P h i l i p p i n e s . M . A . T h e s i s . 
U. P. School of. Economics. 1988. .. 
* S i g n i f i c a n t at las 
** Significant at 5% 
### S i g n i f i c a n t at 10% 
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Table 18. ESTIMATES OF FACTORS AFFECTING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS' 
DECISION TO WAREHOUSE A GUARANTEED LOAN (MODEL 2) 
Variable Coeff icient Std. Error Prob 
C 9.61490 2.32198 0.000 
FISH 0.22879 0.41741 0.584 
LIVESTOCK 0.23477 0.43196 0. 587 
KBS 1.14917 0.33616 0.004* 
PDBS -0.35202 0.53870 0.513 
LUZON -0.37078 0.36762 0. 313 
"MINDANAO -1.40362 0.58890 0.017** 
INTEREST -0.55406 0.14324 0.000* 
LOANSIZE -0.22357 0.12734 0.079*** 
DEFAULT -2.36582 0.94224 0.012** 
Log Likelihood ratio = 152.87* 
No. of Samples - 285 
Cases with WAREL=1 158 
Cases with WAREL=0 127 
* significant at 1% 
** significant at 5% 
*** significant at 10% 
institutions. Another is that for KBs, a guaranteed loan is no 
different from a regular loan which means that all borrowers are 
evaluated as if there was no guarantee. This implies that the 
borrowers under the guarantee program are the same borrowers the 
bank could have lend to even without the guarantee. 
The location of the business is also a significant factor 
affecting the decision to warehouse a guaranteed loan. The 
positive coefficients indicates that financial institutions 
prefer to warehouse loans originating from either Luzon or 
Visayas. In contrast, the coefficient f6r Mindanao was negative 
and significant (see Table 18). This finding implies that banks 
prefer not to warehouse loans ' ested in Mindanao. One probable 
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explanation for this is the peace and order conditions and the 
"political instability" in the area. 
The other significant factors which affect financial 
institutions' decision to warehouse a loan are interest rates, 
loan size and default conditions. All these variables showed 
negative coefficients suggesting that banks prefer to warehouse 
small size loans and loans with low interest rates that is, loans 
with short-term maturity. Similarly, they prefer to warehouse 
loans which are unlikely to default. These findings seem to 
indicate that banks warehouse less risky loans. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
The performance of the credit guarantee programs to date has 
suggested that the schemes have not significantly improved the 
amount of credit to agriculture. At the very least, the schemes 
succeeded in encouraging banks to participate in the program, as 
shown by the increase in the proportion of guaranteed loans to 
the agricultural loans of banking institutions, in particular, 
for commercial banks. However, even this participation of banks 
is questionable. There are certain indications that banks have 
seen these programs largely as a source of additional loanable 
funds rather than as a risk-reducing mechanism for loans made 
from own funds. This implies that, so far, the program has not 
succeeded in encouraging banks to lend their own funds to the 
priority sectors of the government, in particular to 
agriculture. Moreover, the greater time spent in servicing a 
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guaranteed loan than a non-guaranteed loan implies that the 
program did not effectively reduce the co8t
—
of_lending. 
Finally, it is doubtful whether the program can cater to 
small borrowers or industries. Results show that banks, in 
particular KBs, favor large-sized loans. Only the CIP among the 
guarantee programs is able to serve the small borrowers. GFSME, 
IGLF and QGP seems to have been designed for the fairly large 
borrower. 
IX. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Credit guarantee programs can only be an effective form 
of support to agriculture and indigenous industries if the 
following conditions are met: (1) banks as well as borrowers 
are willing to participate in the schemes; (2) banks use their 
own funds for on-lending; (3) the extent of bank participation 
is not limited to satisfying the requirements of the program or 
boosting their viability; (4) the program is able to cater to 
their targetted clientele; and (5) guarantee programs can have 
enough income to cover their costs. The study, however, 
demonstrates that so far, the above conditions have generally not 
been met. This raises doubts as to the effectiveness of the 
programs or the appropriateness of their design and 
implementation. Some issues which needs to be considered are: 
First, it appears that the guarantee programs, like the previous 
special credit programs, have entailed much administrative work 
which served as one major drawback. It should be noted that there 
is a trade-off between risk and administrative cost. If the 
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increase in administrative cost is higher than the decrease in 
risk costs, then the effectiveness of the guarantee programs is 
reduced and its attractiveness to lender is diminished. 
Guarantee programs will only be successful in inducing banks to 
voluntarily increase their exposure to lending if the overall 
cost declines. This means that the government should be 
concerned not only with reducing bank risks but also 
administrative costs, and in particular information costs. 
In addition, it is doubtful whether banks will be 
enthusiastic in participating in programs that increase their 
transaction costs. For lenders, it is unlikely that they would 
exert much effort in evaluating loan applicants carefully or 
have a different criteria for lending to borrowers under the 
guarantee program. Most likely they will still, evaluate all 
borrowers as if there was no.guarantee. This implies that the 
borrowers accepted under the guarantee program are possibly the 
same borrowers, to ., which they would have lent to anyway even 
without the guarantee. Therefore, enhancing borrowers' credit 
worthiness should also be taken into consideration rather than 
simply reducing lender's risk of non-repayment.. Lenders can 
device various ways to take care of risk and collateral is one of 
them. Banks can simply adjust collateral requirements to take 
care of differences in the riskiness of investments. 
On the borrowers side, it is also unlikely that they will be 
willing to participate In programs with high transaction costs. 
If they want to participate, they are most likely the high risk 
borrowers to which banks would not lend to anyway. 
A second consideration is the issue on accreditation. There 
seems to be a conflict with the criteria for accrediting banks 
and the guarantee program's aim to cater to small borrowers or 
rural-based industries. Accreditation criteria particularly on 
arrearages are rigorous such that only commercial banks are most 
likely to meet them. It is generally known that commercial banks 
are more familiar with the large urban-based industries. In 
contrast, rural banks are generally more familiar with 
agriculture and rural-based industries, yet they are least likely 
to be accredited* it is not surprising therefore, that most 
loans under the guarantee programs are fairly large-sized loans 
since most of the accredited banks are commercial banks. Except 
for the Crop insurance Program, only a few rural banks, are 
accredited. Hence, for credit programs to really cater to 
cottage.and small industries as well as the poorest and smallest 
farmers, rural banks should be tapped as the main conduits of the 
. s • 
program. And for this, ^he rehabilitation of rural banks becomes 
absolutely essential. 
On the other hand, the accreditation of most commercial 
banks is in line with the guarantee scheme's "learning" 
objective, which- is for banks, in particular KBs, to become 
acquainted with lending to the priority sectors with the 
expectation that they would be more inclined to make loans even 
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without the guarantee. But this can only succeed if banks would 
consider the guarantee schemes as risk-reducing mechanisms and 
not a liquidity mechanism. This means that banks should consider 
the "guarantee" as an "add-on" to the borrowers credit 
worthiness. 
A third issue arising from the credit guarantee schemes is 
the question of sustaining the viability of the guarantee 
programs. The details of the scheme, i.e, the level of guarantee 
fee and risk-sharing should be designed with the intention that 
fees and other income will cover all costs arising from both the 
administration of the schemes and claims. For instance, the 
guarantee fee should appropriately reflect the risk involved in 
financing different investments. A fee lower than the "true 
risk" will jeopardize the viability of the fund, since claims and 
administrative cost would exceed the available funds. Further, 
it would also cause delay in payment of claims which would 
undermine the credibility of the guarantee institutions. On the 
other hand, high fees will likely limit the participation of 
both banks and borrowers. 
Finally, the generally negative results of this analysis 
should not be surprising. policymakers in many countries 
frequently seize on the idea of credit crop guarantee and 
insurance schemes to stimulate the expansion of agricultural 
lending. Yet the analysis of the experience of many countries 
suggests that guarantee program contribute little to 
additionality in lending (Biggs 1986, Levitsky 1987) and crop 
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insurance program are generally not self-supporting and require 
large amounts of subsidy (Hazell et al. 1986). The experience of 
these countries suggekt that governments may have other 
objectives in mind besides the narrower economic areas implied 
here. In some cases, they may have wanted to increase bank 
earnings. In other cases, they may have wanted to provide 
welfare and to borrowers in time of distress or with permanent 
income transfer to them. The question that must be asked is if 
these guarantee and insurance programs are the most cost-
effective way of achieving these goals. 
These results demonstrate the difficulty of effectively 
"pushing" credit to priority sectors. Rather than spending so 
many resources over the years in interest subsidies, 
rediscounting schemes and now guarantee schemes, one wonders if 
more wouldn't have been accomplished if the same resources would 
have been spent on removing the obstacles that discourage the 
lenders from serving this clientele, such as the lack of 
information about expected commodity prices, poor or non-existent 
information about the indebtedness and post repayment record of 
prospective borrowers, underdeveloped markets for farm inputs and 
output. 
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